vance and similarity to the Sarin releases occurred in the US demolition operations at the Khamisiyah Pit in Iraq (1991) believed to have been a possible source of the "Gulf War Syndrome". According to this case study if Sarin agent was indeed stored in the alleged Syrian chemical weapons sites then various populated areas around ground zero would have experienced lethal or life-threatening effects, irreversible or other serious long-lasting adverse health effects or at least notable discomfort. Moreover, if the Khamisiyah Pit Sarin ammunitions demolition operation was indeed the source of the "Gulf War Syndrome" then the incontrovertible multiple uses of Sarin against the Syrian population (possibly aggravated by the April 14, 2018 attacks) might give rise to a similar "Syrian War Syndrome" which is likely to appear in the future. Forensically, if after the bombardment of the alleged Sarin storage sites in Syria there are no symptoms of exposure to Sarin in populated areas close to ground zero (predicted and mapped by the postulated scenaria of the present work) then that may be a strong indication that the attacks were probably unjustified and unfair.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is incontrovertible proof that chemical weapons, especially Sarin and Chlorine, have been recently used in Syria against innocent civilians. The civilized world has been alerted to these atrocities and has justifiably threatened to punish those responsible for committing crimes against humanity. This work will not be concerned with the identification of the perpetrators who have not been identi- , 1994) . On the other hand, the total quantity of high explosives in the explosive train of the munitions (fuse+burster) used to disperse the agents usually varies from fractions of a kilogram to roughly ten kilograms (US Army Chemical Materiel Destruction Agency, 1994; TM 9-1325 TM 9- -200, 1966 (Hyde, 1997; TM 43-0001-28 , 1996 B. Meteorological Parameters All simulations in this study assume very unfavorable weather conditions which considerably increase the concentration of the chemical agents close to the ground, thus a few comments regarding unfavorable and worst-case atmospheric scenaria are necessary. Worst-case scenaria set upper limits of possible preventive and mitigation procedures while average reasonably unfavorable scenaria are indicative of the risk associated with the problem at hand. For example finding the absolutely worstcase input parameters (an extremely difficult task) may lead to unrealistic modelling and suggest exaggerated preventive and mitigations actions. Simple, plausible, unfavorable scenaria, however, can sometimes adequately illustrate the magnitude of the problem without risking being labeled extreme and unrealistic. The Gaussian dispersion model used by EPICODE for point sources on the ground yields maximum downwind concentrations for low wind speeds (concentrations are inversely proportional to wind speed) and moderately stable atmospheres (e.g. stability class F) for a wide range of deposition velocities. However, extremely small wind speed values will yield unrealistic results especially for zero deposition velocities. Even the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recommends (EPA-454/R-99-005, 2000 ) the use of a minimum wind speed threshold of 0.5 m/s. In addition, explosives releases in EPICODE (Homann & Alluzi, 2016) and HOTSPOT (Homann & Aluzzi, 2013) zero due to the complex form of the source term which is no longer point-like but an extended source whose geometry is determined by the explosion energy. Consequently, it should be emphasized that predictive Gaussian model simulations in arms control studies must be a combination of realism and pessimism (unfavorable scenario adoption), while reconstructive simulations should input the most reliable available input parameters from credible sources. For example, for obvious reasons, the attacker in most cases would prefer to launch his attack at night which enhances the probability of F, E and D Pasquill stability classes. For many practical purposes a Gaussian plume model with a stability class F and a low wind speed (such as one meter per second) yields sufficiently conservative results for ground releases (Homann & Aluzzi, 2013) .
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C. Deposition Velocity
When particulate and gaseous materials are dispersed in the atmosphere, they are transferred to the ground surface through a variety of mechanisms collectively described as dry deposition (in the absence of precipitation) (Sugiyama, et al., 2014) . Accordingly, Sarin, after its explosive release (in the form of aerosols or vapors), will be deposited on the ground (and other surfaces such as trees, water etc.) due to gravitational settling, turbulent diffusion and Brownian motion while various other chemical and biological processes will contribute to the plume depletion. A crucial parameter in the dispersion of Sarin (and in the dispersion of any other atmospheric pollutant) is its deposition velocity, which for most gaseous and particulate materials dispersed into the atmosphere vary from v d =0.001 cm/sec to v d =10 cm/sec (Sugiyama, et al., 2014) . Sarin has a boiling point slightly larger than that of water, and when exposed to the high temperatures of an explosion (thousand degrees Celsius) a large quantity of the agent will be vaporized and dispersed with a practically zero deposition velocity. The rest of the agent will be either aerosolized and dispersed with small deposition velocities (similar to those associated with an explosive release of hot water aerosols) or form pools and hotspots in the vicinity of ground zero and continue to evaporate after the attack. Note that we are only concerned with dry deposition disregarding for the time being wet deposition velocities (i.e. due to precipitation) and any other mechanism of agent removal from the atmosphere. Large deposition velocities increase the concentrations close to ground zero and deplete the cloud at large distances while very small deposition velocities (e.g. associated with vapors) allow the cloud to reach larger distances. The most conservative assumption (unrealistic) is that the high temperatures of the explosion completely vaporize the entire quantity of Sarin which is then deposited downwind at a deposition velocity close to zero. Such an assumption, however, would lead to unrealistically large concentration estimates downwind even at very large distances. Hence, it is reasonable to bracket the effects of Sarin dry deposition (aerosol and vapors) by studying the concentrations downwind in particularly unfavorable meteorological conditions assuming deposition velocities from v d =0.0 cm/s to v d =10 cm/sec although the most plausible dry deposition velocity is v d =0.3 cm/s recommended for the respirable component of the source term (particles with less than 10μm aerodynamic diameter) by EPICODE 8.0 (Homann & Alluzi, 2016) ), HOTSPOT 3.0.3 (Homann, 2015) and by the US DoD NARAC software RASCAL (US NRC RASCAL 3.0, 2000). It should be underlined that, even the US DoD modelers (running the codes HPAC/SCIPUFF) for explosive releases of Sarin also assumed a dry gaseous deposition value of 0.3 cm/sec (2000 modelling, (US DOD Technical Report, 2002) ). In particular, DHS and CIA field tests (carried out in May 1997) associated with the Khamisiyah incident (US DOD Technical Report, 2002)) suggested that when high explosives detonate close to 122mm rockets filled with Sarin they can cause the sympathetic detonation of the rocket's central burster which will rupture the warhead releasing the liquid chemical agent in the vicinity of the explosion. The bulk of Sarin will form liquid pools soaking into the sand and/or raining onto other surrounding material before slowly evaporating while only a small amount will be instantaneously turned into a cloud of Sarin vapors and aerosol, which will pose a great inhalation hazard due to the high volatility and vapor pressure of Sarin. A typical 122 mm Sarin rocket contained 6.3 kg of chemical agent with an agent purity of approximately 50% and the ration of Sarin to cyclosarin was 3:1. Due to its non-specific nature the present work will assume 100% purity of Sarin (no cyclosarin, no precursors to be mixed before the explosion), with no degradation of the chemical agent although any percentage of impurity or degradation will simply scale the source term and the concentrations downwind.
D. Explosive dispersion of 100 tons and 100 kg of
Sarin with 100 kg of TNT Let us assume that 100 tons of pure Sarin stored at a large chemical weapons site (National Reseach Council, 1984) is explosively dispersed with 100 kg of TNT. Such a dispersion can be caused by the combined explosion of a Tomahawk missile warhead and the bursters of several chemical weapons munitions. Similar TNT equivalent energy yields can be achieved in terrorist attacks with a vehicle born improvised explosive device (VBID) such as a car loaded with explosives (FEMA, 2011) . Running a few explosion model simulations with various time-averaged wind speeds ranging from 1 m/s to 12 m/s and focusing only on night-time attacks (stability classes F, E, D and zero deposition velocity v d =0) shows that up to a distance of one kilometer the maximum wind-speed associated with an F class stability (i.e. u=3 m/s, thickest dark blue line) gives lower concentrations downwind than a reasonably high wind speed associated with a D class stability (u=12 m/s, thickest orange line). This trend is reversed for the aforementioned weather parameter combinations at distances larger than one kilometer from ground zero. Although a quantity of 100 tons of Sarin has been used in Figure II .1, the same trends will be observed for any other arbitrary quantity since the concentration of the chemical agent downwind is proportional to the source term (except for ground zero). For example if the quantity of Sarin dispersed in the detonation is one thousand times smaller (i.e. 100 kg) then all quantities on the vertical axis should be divided by 1,000 (see Figure II .2). Therefore in night attacks there is a competition of worseness (i.e. lethality) between (Stability Class F, u=3 m/s) and (Stability Class D, u>3 m/s). Adopting a more plausible deposition velocity v d =0.3 cm/sec (thick dashed lines) and a reasonable upper limit v d =10 cm/sec (thick dotted lines) we can bracket the possible concentration values downwind by plotting in the same color the curves corresponding to the same meteorological conditions, i.e. three orange lines (solid, dashed, dotted) for (Stability Class D, u=12 m/s) and three blue lines (solid, dashed, dotted) for (Stability Class F, u=3 m/s). Figure II .1 and Figure II .2 suggests that in the event of night attacks where a quantity of 100 tons (100 kg) of Sarin is dispersed with an explosion of 100 kg TNT there is a probability that individuals up to a distance of 85 km (10 km) downwind from ground zero who remain for ten minutes inside the Sarin plume could experience lifethreatening health effects or death as the concentration at their position can possibly be 0.37 mg/m 3 (the receptor will be in an AEGL-3 zone). Assuming a linear risk model the lethal probabilities downwind scale with the quantities of Sarin released therefore the risk at a certain distance from ground zero associated with the dispersion of 100 tons of Sarin is one thousand times larger than the risk associated with the dispersion of 100 kg of Sarin. Regarding the more plausible scenario of the explosive release of 100 kg of Sarin with 100 kg of TNT (Stability Class F, u=3 m/sec, Mixing Height=1000, v d =0.3 cm/sec, see thick dashed blue lines in Figure II .2) EPICODE yields the following output: the AEGL-3 zone (life-threatening health effects or death) can reach distances of 24 km downwind covering an area of 8.9 km 2 , the AEGL-2 zone (irreversible or other serious, long-lasting adverse health effects) can reach distances of 54 km downwind covering an area of 34 km 2 and finally the AEGL-1 zone (discomfort, irritation, or certain asymptomatic non-sensory effects) can reach distances larger than 200 km downwind covering an area of 303 km 2 . In the event that 100 tons of Sarin are dispersed with the same quantity of TNT EPICODE predicts that all three AEGL zones will exceed a distance of 200 km covering areas as follows AEGL-3 (4000 km 2 ), AEGL-2 (6000 km 2 ), AEGL-1 (8000 km 2 ). The average population density in Syria is approximately 100 people per km 2 (2018) therefore the explosive release of 100 kg of Sarin after an attack on its alleged remaining chemical weapons sites could theoretically cause several thousand deaths and tens of thousands of victims suffering irreversible health effects. It is now obvious that a more focused study should be carried out regarding Syria focusing on the alleged chemical weapons sites that were targeted by the allied forces. Reportedly, the attacks were in response to the alleged Syrian government use of chemical weapons against innocent civilians -an accusation denied by the Syrian government. The strikes began at 9 pm EDT, April 13 (04:00, April 14, in Syria) targeting with missiles three sites (Rocha, et al., 2018 ; US DoD, 2018): The Barzah research center located in Barzeh Damascus, an alleged chemical weapons storage facility near Homs (Him Shinshar), and an alleged equipment storage facility and command post also near Homs. The weapon of choice was again (Gearan & Ryan, 2018 ) the Tomahawk missile whose actual yield (in TNT equivalent) is a significant input parameter in this report. Various other missiles were used during the April 14, 2018 operation such as the joint air-to-surface standoff missiles, Storm Shadow missiles, SCALP cruise missiles etc. (US DoD, 2018). However, their TNT equivalent will be covered by the range of 10 kg to 100 kg TNT that will be postulated for the Tomahawk missiles.
A. Tomahawk Cruise Missiles Fundamentals
The main weapon used by the USA in the April 14, 2018 attacks against Syria was the Tomahawk cruise missile (Gearan & Ryan, 2018 ) which can carry unitary or submunition warheads. Unitary warheads are actually kinetic energy penetrators (extremely hard penetrating devices) carrying as protective capsules inside them a quantity of high explosives to be detonated inside the target. Unitary (kinetic energy) warheads are used against hard and/or buried targets such as weapons production and storage facilities which are relevant to the present study. On the other hand, submunition warheads are actually clusters of bomblets which are Lewis & Postol, 1992 ; US NAVY , 2018) penetrate hard targets either relying solely on the kinetic energy of their hardened warhead (kinetic energy penetrator plus high explosives inside) or by using a multiple warhead system which consist of forwardmounted shaped-charge devices and the main kinetic energy penetrator. The precursor devices are designed to precondition the hard target for defeat by either thickening its wall or, if possible, forming a channel along the line of sight so that the followthrough kinetic energy penetrator, which is the main warhead carrying the bulk of high explosives, can penetrate more effectively and detonate inside the target. The precise TNT equivalent of the high explosives carried either by the forward-mounted shaped-charge warheads or by the main kinetic energy penetrator warhead is classified. However, various sources converge on an approximate total weight of 450 kg (Tsipis, 1983; Hewish, 1998; Lewis & Postol, 1992) for the warhead which carries a quantity of (Hewish, 1998) 23 kg to 135 kg of high explosives. Unburnt fuel remaining in the missile at the time of warhead detonation is another crucial parameter as it will be ignited and increase the energy of the explosion (for example a BGM-109 missile carried 272 kg of fuel and modern Tomahawk variants are expected to carry similar amounts). Based on the preceding analysis it is very reasonable to assume that a Tomahawk missile unitary warhead can have a yield ranging at least from 10 kg TNT to 100 kg TNT (the upper limit of this conservative assumption has already been used Section II). west of the Barzah center) there was a SW wind with an average speed of approximately 10 km/h (2.77 m/sec) and an average temperature of 12°C (these relatively low temperatures lasted until 07:00 and doubled by 16:00). Given the overall uncertainties of the historical weather data the postulated attack scenario on the Barzah research center will be modelled by assuming the explosive dispersal of one, ten and one hundred kilograms of Sarin with explosions of ten and one hundred kg TNT with deposition velocities ranging from 0.3 cm/sec to 10 cm/sec. According to Section II night hours with low wind speeds (~3 m/sec) suggest a stability class F. We will also assume an average inversion height of 1000 m. The relatively low temperature will lower the plume evaporation rate for hours which is an additional negative factor. In an actual missile attack its warhead will explode after penetrating the structures where Sarin has been stored and therefore the actual release of the agent into the atmosphere is not easily modelled and predictable as has already been underlined. Various factors such as the walls of the target and the ensuing debris from the demolished target would reduce the amount of Sarin which would be rendered airborne. Due to these inevitable uncertainties, the postulated scenaria in this work are very conservative as they disregard all barriers which could prevent the dispersion of the Sarin plume into the atmosphere after the explosion. Figures Likewise, under the same input parameters receptors up to a distance of 10 km (AEGL-2 concentration: 0.086 mg/m 3 ) downwind could experience serious health effects (some long-lasting and irreversible) and finally people standing for the same time at distances up to 38 km downwind from ground zero might complain for irritation and notable discomfort (AEGL-1 concentration: 0.0069 mg/m 3 ). If the deposition velocity is larger (v d =10 cm/sec) the above three distances are reduced to 2.2km/3.6km/6.9km respectively (AEGL-3/2/1). According to the same Figure III .1 on the other hand, if one kilogram of Sarin is dispersed with 100 kg of TNT the above AEGL-3/3/1 maximum distances for deposition velocities of 0.3 cm/sec and 10 cm/sec respectively are 0.33 km/3.7 km /16 km and 0.2 km/3 km/8 km. Finally, Figure III Figure III .3 indicate that the larger the quantities of Sarin released in the postulated scenario the larger the maximum distances and the covered areas for the three AEGL-3/2/1 risk zones. The striking outcome of the previous calculations is that if kilograms (hundreds of kilograms) of Sarin are dispersed from a typical chemical weapons site with small quantities of explosives (~10 kg TNT) and the plume travels uninhibited downwind then there is a probability that unprotected people who remain immersed in the cloud downwind for at least ten minutes may experience lethal or serious adverse health effects tens (hundreds) of kilometers away from ground zero. Owing to the large errors associated with the direction of the wind, risk assessment and predictions as well as evacuation and mitigation decisions should not be based exclusively on the idealized cigar-shaped isodose contours of the Gaussian model. Rather, to eliminate uncertainties and errors associated with wind direction variability a 360° potential hazard circular zone should also be mapped and considered. Accordingly, Figure III .4. shows three concentric circular risk zones (centered on the Barzah Research Center) AEGL-3 (red), AEGL-2 (green), AEGL-1 (blue) and consists of two maps adjacent to each other where the lower one is obviously a magnification of the upper one. The three inner circular risk zones (red, green, blue) correspond to the dispersion of 1 kg of Sarin (360° Risk Zone Radii: 4.1km/10km/38km) while the three outer ones (red, green, blue) correspond to the dispersion of 100 kg of Sarin (360° Risk Zone Radii: 104km/153km/200km 50km/94km/191km). Obviously, the radii of the circular risk zones are the maximum distances at which a particular AEGL zone can extend (as predicted by EPIcode). Both scenaria (1 kg and 100 kg of Sarin) assume 10-min exposures, night attacks with an explosion of 10 kg TNT equivalent and the following meteorological parameters: stability class F, wind speed 3 m/sec, Mixing Height 1000 m, deposition velocity 0.3 cm/sec (the lower map only shows the AEGL-3 and AEGL-2 zones). A more realistic hazard prediction relies on the isodose contours derived by EPIcode which also calculates the areas enclosed by the three AEGL zones for the postulated Sarin explosive releases. . The average population density of Syria is about 100 inhabitants per km 2 , thus to obtain the number of people expected to be inside a particular AEGL risk zone the aforementioned areas should be multiplied by 100. Note that due to the meteorological conditions during the attack the three AEGL zones would probably be covering areas to the north-east of the Barzah Research Center which is a rather sparsely populated area. Fortunately, considering the wind direction during the attack Damascus was located upwind and therefore the capital of Syria Theodore E. Liolios, Konstantinos G. Kolovos: Military and Terrorist A great source of concern was that, if the targets were indeed Sarin storage sites, a military attack on them would result in explosive releases of large quantities of Sarin, which is what had happened during the US demolition operations at the Khamisiyah Pit in Iraq (1991) believed to have been a possible source of the "Gulf War Syndrome". Thus, after simulating a random release of 100 kg and 100 tons of Sarin (large storage sites) with a powerful 100 kg TNT explosion (compatible with yields expected in military and terrorist attacks) this work focused on a case study, namely the April 14, 2018 missile attacks against Syria. Using appropriate meteorological and weapons data all the parameters of the attacks were restricted within a reasonable range of values. For each attack a reasonable explosive yield range was postulated which could result from a combination of missile and chemical munitions explosions (terrorist attacks and accidents are obviously covered by the same scenaria). The simulations assumed that the night attacks on the alleged Sarin weapons sites in Syria (Barzah Research Center, Him Shinshar) resulted in the explosive dispersion of 1 kg, 10 kg and 100 kg of Sarin with 10 kg TNT and 100 kg TNT, respectively, adopting the meteorological parameters that existed at the time of attack and two reasonably constraining values for the deposition velocity (0.3 cm/sec, 10 cm/sec). Sarin plume centerline concentrations were plotted with respect to distance downwind for the above parameters and the results were also illustrated on Google Earth Maps in two forms: Three AEGL-3/2/1 concentric circular risk zones around ground zero and two AEGL-3/2 isodose contours, with the former showing a 360° risk zone to allow for wind direction uncertainties and the latter showing a more precise footprint of the AEGL zones. In the main text there are detailed data and analysis for each particular simulation of this report, however the results mapped in Figure III .4, Figure III .5, and Figure III .6, illustrate vividly the dimensions of the postulated hazard which, given the uncertainties of the Gaussian models, can be expressed as follows: If kilograms (hundreds of kilograms) of Sarin are dispersed from a typical chemical weapons site with an explosion of few kilograms TNT and the plume travels uninhibited downwind then there is a probability that unprotected people who remain immersed in the cloud downwind for at least ten minutes may experience lethal or serious adverse health effects tens (hundreds) of kilometers away from ground zero and the corresponding risk zones can cover a few square kilometers (a few hundred square kilometers). For example the explosive dispersion of (1 kg/100 kg) Sarin with 10 kg of TNT would create three AEGL-3/2/1 zones which would cover areas as follows:
B. Simulating the missile attacks against the Barzah Research Center
AEGL-3 (0.33km ) and would extend up to distances of AEGL-3 (4.1km/50km), AEGL-2 (10km/94km) and . The average population density of Syria is about 100 inhabitants per km 2 , thus to obtain the number of people expected to be inside a particular AEGL risk zone the aforementioned areas should be multiplied by 100. The undeniable scientific result of this report is that even if a few kilograms of Sarin had been explosively released from the alleged chemical weapons sites targeted in Syria then hundreds to thousands of people would have experienced lethal or serious irreversible health effects. Moreover, if the Sarin released at the Khamisiyah Pit in Iraq (1991) is indeed a source of the "Gulf War Syndrome" then the April 14, 2018 attacks against the alleged Sarin sites in Syria might have generated a similar "Syrian War Syndrome". The international community should keep monitoring the targeted areas in Syria for possible symptoms. However, regardless of the release of Sarin from the targeted sites it is obvious that the repeated criminal use of Sarin in Syria may give rise to a "Syrian War Syndrome" anyway, possibly aggravated by the April 14, 2018 attacks.
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